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Abstract
A summary is provided of Ruyer’s important contribution, a reversal
from some conclusions held in his secondary doctoral dissertation,
about the limits inherent in technological progress, and an attempt is
made to show the coherence of this position with Ruyer’s metaphysics.
Simondon’s response is also presented, and subsequently analysed
especially as it culminates in a concept of concretisations. As Simondon
indicated, and with a displacement in Ruyer’s limiting framework on
unconditional growth, we end up searching for what represents the
category of the ultimate for those two philosophers of the cyberworld.
Keywords: technological determinism, Cournot, Ruyer, Simondon,
industrial development, information
I. Introduction: Cournot Philosophising on the Conquest of
the World and the Stringency of Social Planning
When philosopher of science Raymond Ruyer (1902–87) prepared his
primary and secondary doctoral dissertations for the Doctorat ès lettres
at the École normale supérieure, he chose for the first to try to identify
the element or ingredient of reality that could account for reality’s
ultimate knowability, and found it in the notion of ‘structure’, in both
a geometric and physical sense. This philosophy could not further
proceed in light of what was discovered when he was interned at an
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Offizierslager during World War II, in the company of some of France’s
best scholars – among whom were embryologist E. Wolff and botanist A.
Moyse. Ruyer spent more time then considering things that would not fit
so well in his overall interpretive scheme, such as morphic development
in biology.
What is interesting for our purposes is to consider how he chose for
his secondary dissertation the question of humankind’s future according
to Antoine A. Cournot (1801–77). This was an attempt to implement in
a subject charged with much philosophical significance the key insight
into a mechanical ordering of the interactions of multiple elements.
In so doing, Ruyer met Cournot’s pioneering attempts to try to map
geometrical insights onto the question of how the steering over a social
order was possible, when ‘free life’ had started to exert its call, and had
produced multifarious shapes and structural relationships (see Cournot
1875; Liard 1877: 112–15).
When very many individuals do very many things, one gets close to
the etymological significance of complexity, ‘a great many objects and a
great number of figures’. Cournot’s proposal in front of model-building
and societal becoming was to think that a force, an element driving the
tendency to reproduction, accounted for genealogical relationships and
the perpetuation of life, but to also think that rational order was inimical
to it. Engineering uses simplified models of reality and always in a sense
ends up forcing reality into these models. Cournot theorised that the
living force, with its charge of emotional relatedness, would become less
important, and that with rational planning and ordering taking over,
the law of statistical averaging would come to win, and produce a world
in which wars, heroism and antagonisms that drive complexity would
dwindle and die (see Ruyer 1930: 15–16).
II. Ruyer’s View of Technology’s Inherent Dynamic
In his article on technology’s inherent drive to progress (Ruyer 1958:
412–23), which was the occasion for a response by G. de Santillana
(1958), Ruyer first exposes Cournot’s insight that societies are made
from two different substrata, that they are a mix of elements like the
Minotaur. Ruyer recalls how Cournot distinguished, in his ontology,
between three elements: (1) the material; (2) the living –which as a realm
cannot be understood by us rationally; and (3) the rational. Rationality
is a power that arises in human beings but it is also a project requiring an
anticipated completion, and we discover sometimes with astonishment
that it is endowed with an internal determinism that will lead to its own
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entanglement in itself. It places human beings outside of life, and as such
the historical outlook allows the reasonable and the utilitarian to win
over the poetic and the heroic (Cournot 1861: 16, 170, 222–40). Not
only will those two elements bring about the end of those instincts which
do not follow from the use of reason, but the temporality of populations
that are not rationally organised as civilisations will not possess true
historical elements. History takes over when thinking and planning
beings discern reference points, as part of the work of rationality.
The German philosopher and literary figure, Ernst Jünger
(1895–1998), like Cournot, admired in many native peoples the
activities that determine time, as opposed to those activities, in their
abstract nature, that universalise time, sending one to work and calling
one back home (Jünger [1959](1994): 20–2). In these cultures, time is
deemed ahistorical. A people that have reached a high level of rationally
organised civilisatory effort will have no history, Jünger says. The time
in-between these two periods of ‘dream’ so to speak, the time of history,
has been a time of war and conquest, the playground for a certain
irrationality.
Cournot, like Jünger, possessed a significant vitalist component within
his thought. He believed in a principle of animation, a force that gave
life to the social fabric, but one that could also choose to disappear from
it, and leave it to its own destiny or fate, somewhat like the biblical God
who, faced with human creatures’ rebellion, lets them exploit their own
resources, which, for example, leads to the confusion in language around
the Tower of Babel (Gen. 11). Ruyer considers, drawing on the then
prevalent structuralism, that primitive societies were not calculated such
as ours are, and wages that our own living civilised societies, instead
of being driven into mechanisation of relationships, will reconstitute
themselves as would a living being, as a biological organism regenerating
or regrowing its body, such that the periods of social physics of the
‘Quetelet’ style (2013: 96–108) will serve to prepare new becomings.1
Ruyer considers that Cournot’s most solid thesis is the one that deals
with technology as an external prolongation of the internal technology
of life. Cournot imagined a law of arithmetic progression but irreversible
summation, in other words a progression by accretion. For Ruyer,
it remains to be seen what the nature of this progression is. Is it
exponential? Is it factorial? Provocatively, Ruyer asserts that the march
of progress in the technical sense will stop, that it will get exhausted:
we cannot continue following the accelerated curve. This is not for him
an extrapolation of that same seemingly linear function, it is rather the
impossibility of any extrapolation as far as transformation of available
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resources is concerned, because of scarcity and the vanishing of raw
materials, which entails that inventions will have to be limited.
Ruyer makes it plain that there are two laws that come to clash:
first, the law of conservation of matter–energy; and second, the free
multiplication of form or idea. The second law contains, in a certain
sense, all his philosophy. The cost of information in a physical support,
as L. Brillouin established in a famous analysis, is not zero, but it also
has no common measure with the cost of industrial realisations and
projects. It costs almost nothing for nature to multiply germ cells, and
even fertilised eggs, but nature cannot drive and nurture to fully-fledged
form all those eggs, because what is missing is energetic resources in
the form of foodstuffs. In the same way, material and energetic capitals’
availability limit their progress, just as the challenge of subsisting limits
the possibilities of reproduction.
When the industrial system becomes one with the social system, they
eventually come to control technical mutations and manifest a tendency
to self-conserve and resist the forces of change. One could think that the
line of acceleration of progress would keep going with the conquering
effort divided between giant conglomerates, but we easily understand
that in the context of large social planning, which seems to imply
a progress that is accelerated, there is in fact the dawn of a social
crystallisation.
Ruyer considers that even if one were to go wrong in foreseeing how
accelerated progress would have to slow down, it is impossible to go
wrong in predicting the fact that the acceleration of industrialisation will
end. For him, Cournot judged wrongly when he spoke of a summation
of continued accretion of technical progress; in fact, it is certainly
accelerated, but then it breaks down and stops. Continued growth, even
outpacing forecasts, that comes to a sudden halt, is best captured by the
sigmoid function (see Figure 1).
If one plots along the abscissa the independent variable of time, and
on the ordinate the speed of, for example, the computer processor, where
Moore’s law as initially stated tells us that that speed will double every
twelve months, one sees that continued growth as predicted must come
to a halt. R. Kurzweil, author of The Age of Spiritual Machines (1998:
254–5), states that a grander law seems to apply according to which,
even if refinements to an innovation were to begin to run up against
physical and technical constraints, a new paradigm would emerge and
continue the trend. Behind Kurzweil’s rhetoric around the rarity of
organisation and its inevitability, which he ties to the inevitability of the
build-up of complexity, is an instanciation of the ‘principle of plenitude’.
October 16, 2017 Time: 02:36pm dls.2017.0284.tex
542 Philippe Gagnon
y
x
Figure 1. Sigmoid function.
Even to those, such as K. Shapiro, who have objected the far-away
nature of nanobots, or the limitations of the reorganisation powers of
the brain, or even the absence of any superiority in computers’ capacity
to solve problems contrasted to ours save for speed, Kurzweil could
always reassert his law of ‘rare and plentiful’ since it is based on a
tacit attribution of powers to ratchet up when progress encounters
obstacles (Shapiro 2005: 67). As I. Hutchinson pointed out, this leaves
out the fact that we have in such a case two intertwined, and profoundly
different, dynamics, with successes of the digital tested on analogical
neural networks (Hutchinson 2000: 261).
One more point is worth expounding on. We have seen how Cournot
thought in terms of ‘realms’, and this is precisely the cosmological
outlook that Ruyer has come to reject, inviting us instead to think
in terms of fibrous lines of individualised development, with lateral
openness for colonisations and thus further transformations (Ruyer
1968: 189). For Ruyer, what is fundamental is that developing beings
aim at a value, which is also participation in a developmental scheme.
When this is contrasted to Cournot’s realms presented earlier, the idea of
a passage from the vital/organic to the mechanical, the mathematicised
and the geometrised must as a thesis be discarded, since a true form
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cannot be destroyed in any statistical scattering, as it is, in Ruyerian
language, a condition of possibility of such statistical existence (Ruyer
1970a: 232–4).
Ruyer’s Metaphysically Grounded Guiding Principles: The Place of
‘Thematism’
One of the most striking traits of Ruyer’s metaphysics is the positioning
of this ultimate vital force within an act of existence through a vertical
harmonisation with a ‘theme’, such that rationality is not primarily
about problems ordered by language and logic, but is about the capacity
to achieve organic togetherness.
Therefore, concerning the development of biological organisms, the
laying off of parts and appendages, the re-entering into the theme of
various parts, is not to be understood as the setting of oneself on tracks
that would conduce any reality to a final obedience of rationality to
some mindless physical force. Rather, there is a homogeneous order
among the parts, one that can be retrieved behind the orientation of any
parts’ velocity that is held in a common direction when, say, for exam-
ple, a watermill is propelled into a structured order, which establishes
that the watermill itself would never be repaired and maintained, nor
would the body of the mill operator be produced in the first place, if all
there ever was is such a process of homogeneous ordering (Ruyer 1968:
118–22). As Whitehead saw this, it would be akin to claiming that the
process responsible for the incessant ebb and flow of water waves on
the shore could just as well have built up the ship (Whitehead [1929]
1958: 13–14).
III. Simondon on the Stages in Technological Development and
the Conditions for Concretisation
Choosing to write, a year later, a response to Ruyer’s presentation,
Gilbert Simondon (1924–89) did not at first consider Ruyer’s ‘inverted’
fatalism, or deterministic corrected vitalism, as a philosophy that might
seriously influence him (Simondon 2010: 231). For Simondon, it is
indeed possible to see technological development as taking a road
leading to a form of rationalist alienation from vital human values, but
this only takes place because the technological object is set against an
environment that is not homogeneously changing with it.
Simondon pays much attention to the series of possible objective
concretisations, and notes how we tend to identify technical progress
October 16, 2017 Time: 02:36pm dls.2017.0284.tex
544 Philippe Gagnon
with human progress. How do we know that this progress, exhausting
the means and materials of implementation of ideas born in its wake, is
not going to be superseded by yet another form of progress?
Objective concretisations have kept reappearing, and human beings
have made themselves their promoters. In every cycle of progress, the
human element forms a system with what is being concretised, but many
latent possibilities are always left out at the same time. Analysing things
alongside a tripartite division:
humanity/language⇒ humanity/religion⇒ humanity/technology,
Simondon points out how the centre of systematisation displaces itself:
it starts by being between human beings and objective concretisation,
and then it is objective concretisation which becomes the whole system.
When human beings excentre themselves, concretisations become
mechanised. This same ‘model inversion’ has been addressed by Ruyer,
pointing out that cybernetics aims at reproducing efficiently and
behaviouristically the action of organs whose finality is swapped into
machine-language programming, except that the macro-structures thus
imitated were themselves kept in being by micro-domains working at the
furtherance of their form.
For Simondon, technology alone is absolutely universalisable; there
is a chance that rationality and alienation may be less impactful vis-
à-vis technology than they would vis-à-vis language and religion. This
presupposes that human beings are able to become homogeneous with
technical objects. The non-alienation threshold would be met when the
human agent intervenes in technology as both operator and object of
operation (Simondon 2010: 233). Technology could create the onset
of a non-sigmoid development if it replaced completely the activity of
language and religion. Thus, what Simondon calls for is nothing short of
an axiological heightening of the technological aspect rendered capable
of expressing sacredness, which means a complete reconciliation of
self and sacred space, a prerogative of a spiritual or angelic being, as
traditional religious terminology would have it.
One can predict that technical progress will not always have the
explosive aspect that it manifests in the domain of objective-rational
concretisation: ‘It would be wrong to confuse technical progress, of value
to vast groups of human beings, with the exceptional results achieved
in the specialist milieu of scientific technology’ (Simondon 2010: 234).
The appearance of an explosive progress is most often due to a non-
harmonised introduction of a technical object in an environment which
is not otherwise modified alongside it. Progress is explosive when in its
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very inception it is scattered (éclaté). For technical progress to be self-
regulative, it has to be a wholesome progress, with all domains of activity
using communication techniques with each other; then we will have
an organic progress in relation to the evolution of man (see Simondon
[1958] 1989: 70).
Simondon therefore considers that Ruyer does not have a unified
or operational framework in which to think technology. This is not
surprising because, even when he writes to express his rejection of
Cournot’s systemic insight into the becoming of rationality, Ruyer
is under the spell of this giant mathematician and statesman. Ruyer
appears as conservative and somewhat reactionary in Simondon’s
construal, as one who rejects most of the illuministic existentialism that
Simondon will manifest in his description of a sort of ersatz of the sacred
in his 3 July 1969 letter (see Simondon 1992).
IV. Simondon and Ruyer on Individuation and
the Latent Unity of a Cosmic Fabric
In his major contribution to a philosophy of individuation, Simondon
notes that substance and individual have been starting points for every
attempt at an ontology (2005: 39–40, 48–9, 92–3). What has been
overshadowed by this way of posing the question of individuation is
the relational process, which makes the thing what it is and makes
it different from all others. It is also an invitation to think about
what could create the conditions for a substitution of the reality
of the individual and, by the operational character of the process
of individuation, renew the classical problem of the principle of
individuation.
It is not so much an ontology that we need as an ontogenesis. If
one succeeded in thinking a relationality antecedent to its terms (even if
relationality already creates a substantival orientation), one would make
of relation a notion that is freed from the stronghold of the traditional
concept of substance. From the viewpoint of gnoseology, one would
not understand knowledge as a direct link between a knowing subject
and a known object, but as a relation between things constituted in
their very being by relations in the process of being-related together.
Therefore, Simondon searches for a thought of the mitsein, of the
in-between, applied to individuals and their milieu. He will speak
of ‘transindividuality’, as this double motion of individualisation of
the individual making itself. Simondon harks back to a tradition, as
Debaise observes, that wants to topple relation and substance/terms, and
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make relation the fundamental category, giving it the same status as
being (Debaise 2004: 16). Deleuze has remarked that the atomists and
the hylomorphists both presupposed something: the atom, the form
which entered into relations.
To turn relation into being, into a definite atomic or objectual self,
and to define the continuing ontic self through time by means of relation
to a milieu, still leaves out the question of the persistence of a self
or individual over time. When Simondon says that relation constitutes
the being of an individual, he means its becoming as ontogenesis. The
continuation through time is grasped by the never-ending relation with
a milieu, as a relation capable of further individuations. This does not
answer the question of the individual becoming different, in other words,
of truly having or undergoing a genesis.
Simondon considers that the ancient atomists looked for the principle
of individuation in the results of individuation and not in the operation
of individualisation. Deleuze noted in Difference and Repetition that
for the ancients, relations gave the impression of happening inside a
time and a space (Deleuze [1968] 2004: 340). Atoms were Parmenides’
‘being’ pulverised, but which retained its properties. For Deleuze, one
should not start the comprehension of multiplicity with a concept of
unity in its multiplication, saying that the multiple is one and the one
is multiple. If this programme is carried to the end, substantive reality
would be multiplicity, and so difference would come to replace the
dialectic of the one of the many. When multiplicity and relation are put
at the centre of everything, the concept of conflict, of !o"#$o%, becomes
central. As Del Lucchese points out (2009: 187), Simondon believed that
the individual is created by its relation to an environment, resisting any
unified flux of cosmic being. As Del Lucchese remarks again, following
Muriel Combes, if one pushes this to the end, and reverses the Hegelian
formulation where we do not get convertibility of real and rational, but
instead of relational and substantive – ‘all that is relational is real, and
all that is real is relational’ – one ends up with an implicit negation of the
very concept of the model, with anarchies substituting themselves for
representations (Del Lucchese 2009: 187; see also Combes 2013: 19).
Therefore, the opposition of Ruyer and Simondon is not a blatant
one and it is not something overt. Simondon allows for an ungraspable
relational yet vital power in nature, a power that is always conjugated
in the present participle, a &'()% in the Greek sense (Simondon 2005:
92), a power that always allows for a plane of orderliness that
is also a permanent potential for individuations in the plural. Like
Whitehead, there are indeed tendencies or lines of trajectory establishing
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individuality as societal occasions, which by an ontological propagation
have amplified themselves as occasions that then represent orders of
order, or ontological hierarchical ordering in terms of a relational-
creative process. In the end, those that have accomplished a temporary
unity and concresced their respective form are the only individuals who
have become truly ‘alive’.
Ruyer adds that there is a difference between any material realisation
encountering limitation and the power of the idea or form itself, which
can be expressed with very little matter in the case of informational
dissemination. When, however, de Santillana responds to Ruyer’s
presentation and talks about the real possibility of machines coming to
control human becoming after achieving self-reproduction (de Santillana
1958: 425), Ruyer ironises this proposal and, in a manner that is
fairly abrupt, calls him to task for verging on the fantastic. For Ruyer,
information requires a framing of human consciousnesses that no
machine might ever accomplish.
If one can object to the idea of information only existing in a human
consciousness, finding that it represents a misunderstanding of what
information theory is all about, as in Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Ruyer
(Merleau-Ponty 1995: 218–19),2 it remains that Ruyer, by insisting on
this ‘mentalisation’ of information being different from machines, has
kept his theory of informational reconstruction away from attempts at
reifying the concept that human beings will always have informational
shortcomings when pitted against machines (e.g. cyborgs, robots,
artificially created intelligence) (see Chapouthier 2013: esp. 25–6).
V. A Duality of Accent, or Alternative Directions in Ontology?
What judgement would Simondon utter on the thought of Ruyer? He
certainly read Ruyer’s book on cybernetics referenced here (Stengers
2002: 144), and if we use his article/response on technology to make
our own judgement, we find Simondon measuring his thought against
that of Ruyer, as one would before an admittedly giant thinker, without
uttering much direct criticism. Simondon is content with reacting to a
very general stance when faced with a problem that is entangled with
prospective and futuristic thinking.
What is more helpful is to reconsider Ruyer’s position, expounded
here with large brushstrokes and with a greater range than only
considering the 1958 article on technology and its limits, while doing it
in the light of Simondon’s framework regarding the harmonious fusing
of the human and the technological, echoing the thought of Ernst Jünger.
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Clearly, for Ruyer (and for Jünger and Simondon) the technological is
aroused, or triggered, when at its end-points of contact with the material
universe, it obeys an action in search of its own harmonious integration
in a cycle. Simondon’s emphasis then goes on to discuss the sustained
powers that allow for a malleable notion of matter to be detached from
any binary, purely rational analysis in terms of $o*&+ and '"+; his is a
notion of matter that always comes to us already informed, sustaining
orders upon orders of relational configuring, which strikes away from
the picture a hasty reduction of the material to a domain controlled
through and through from above in a top-down fashion (Simondon
[1958] 1989: 74).
If one tried to frame the problem in terms of the freedom of the
material universe, thought about as actual entities, to adopt configured
states without mental guidance, one could certainly go in the direction
of classical ‘order from noise’ or ‘order from chance’ paradigms. In these
terms, Ruyer stated that ‘the notion of a pure realm of fluctuations
sorting themselves out is a logical contradiction of the same sort as
the notion of a pure power to change, without the continuity of an
object of which it would be possible to say that it changes’ (Ruyer 1956:
342). Ruyer’s anti-substantialism does not end up in an attempt to make
relations substantial, although he shares in the dethronement of classical
entelechy. The reason for it seems to be that Ruyer does not so much
eliminate substantiality as resorb it in an archetypal domain, thus also
making information ‘form as one’, something that can only come with
mind-imprinted harmony.
The question that remains to be answered is whether or not this would
capture a theory such as that of Simondon. Prima facie, Simondon is not
trying to say that chance variations could have brought about all there
is, whether its mode of organisation be lateral and accidental, or form-
dependent. For him, the fact that there is never an identity but a process
of individualising, of realising concretisations, is also a move towards
the assertion that there is more than identity to be recognised in pre-
individualised states, which ushers in Simondon’s notion of metastability
(Combes 2013: 6). This seems to give him an operator of reversion, since
any theory of the power of life, unity or organisation will need to point
to a reservoir of ontological ‘excess’ where it is definitely not in need
of any higher harmonious integration. We have seen how this comes to
play, and how, substituting differences for dialecticising of the one and
the many, it can only offer anomy, or monstrous individuation since it
is perpetually non-reduced and as such precisely potent in the sense of
,-o($o%, a term often used by Deleuze.
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Figure 2. Chinese room/universal piloting of action. (Source: R. Ruyer, Dieu
des religions, Dieu de la science, 1970, p. 114, translated.)
The project of Simondon has a technological determinist component,
true (de Vries et al. 2015: 301–2), and one wonders what in the end
is the motivation of awaiting a system of the human–technological
that could turn human accomplishments into some furtherance of a
technological remaking of the given, as it comes to us in the (Ruyerian)
form of intelligence via a ‘primary consciousness’. For Ruyer the excess
of this reservoir of ultimate harmonious existence would be found in
the ‘psychic set-up’ to ‘effect of psychic set-up’ circuit. There alone
could one find a justification of the perpetual motion of the third
kind, correcting mechanistic cybernetics with an ontological–axiological
verticality, which is to say, in other words, by an even more universal
framing of vital development. We learn from a nature to which it costs
nothing to pluralise individuality. And yet individuals are nothing but
‘metaphysical zeros’, as Bergson pointed out (Bergson [1907] 1911:
334), they are nothing more than a not-entirely-in-act entity chasing an
existence for itself as a universal.
Simondon’s position lacks a principle of dialecticisation, as everything
seems to become individuation. In those terms, his ontology remains
suspended to the indefinite number of configurations, that are also self-
configurations of natura naturans, testifying to the unfinished symphony
of a universe whose multifarious form-producing powers no one will
ever exhaust. The oft-invoked example of the crystal is still mapped onto
the Parmenidean and Euclidean morphing, and this is why Ruyer, who
also considered it at length in his 1948 Le Monde des valeurs, introduces
what could look like a substantification of the species at the centre of his
‘universe in a parabola’ diagram (see Figure 2).
What Ruyer is in fact doing is to resorb individuality in the #).o%,
not in any abstract idea, but in end as norm. Ruyer does not give more
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reality to any embodied form of individuation, rather he insists on the
suspension of any numerically differentiated individuality.
When this is replaced in the subject of his response to Ruyer, one finds
Simondon siding with the enthusiasm for exploration of all undisclosed
possibilities, which is also – through the promotion of relations over
being – an affirmation of the value of displacement for displacement’s
sake. To the end of the closed world, about which A. Koyré wrote, to
the setting-in of the time of the finite world (Valéry in Regards sur le
monde actuel, 1945), there responds the stamina of some adventurers
who, like Christopher Columbus, take as their mission to pull us out
of the asthenic reduction of human-centred ontologies’ self-interest.
Jules Verne still stands as the most telling example of this travelling-
to-travel drive (Angenot 1979: 22–4), and his tales are not, contrary to
a common misconception, fantastic explorations in science fiction; they
are a projection ahead of the latent and tacit resources not so much of
scientific inventions as of immanent intelligibility that becomes one with
the universe. Typical is Verne’s reaction to H. G. Wells’s fictional writing
on science: ‘I use physics, he invents’ (Dupuy 2013: 134).
For Ruyer, by way of contrast, once the impossible has been negated,
one can look for another means of bridging the gap to an ultimate
meaningfulness. Simondon starts his letter on orthoaesthetics with a
criticism directed at an unjustified rejection of the religious (Simondon
1992: 1). It remains to be appreciated by future research if Simondon’s
open frontier for technological inventiveness is predicated upon the
germs of a technolatry. His description of the ‘gametic’ aspects of
the human to technical object relationship, for instance in the use of
the double-headed mechanical key (6), are not only fascinating, they
correct more powerfully than ever before seen the abstractive original
sin of philosophers. This certainly makes him as important a cybernetic
philosopher as his great ancestor, Ruyer.
For Ruyer, however, whose notion of ‘anti-paradoxes’ we have
discussed, once the impossible has been wiped off, one can look for
another means of bridging the gap to ultimate meaningfulness. Among
the characteristics of our world we find two major ones which, since
the industrial revolution, have gone in opposite directions. One is the
importance given to the freedom of the individual person, and the other
is the quest for power expressed through organised life in common,
which usher in means of socialisation along with a regimentation of life.
As theologian Y. Congar remarked, for all the value attached to freedom,
we have seen how individuals have fallen at the mercy of the nation-state
power, and to that of the industrial enterprise. Factors like competition,
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endless propaganda and aggressive publicity, educational institution and
factories where a concentration of people encourages the use of mass
psychology, and the intervention of the state responsible for the common
good with its view to engineering it, have all tended to reduce human
beings to the state of creatures of the mass. Individuals and parcelled
initiatives have reacted against this, but in what form and shape? There
is a risk of being torn into letting one’s life be split into compartments,
one for working life, for the struggle of dealing with material existence,
and the other for leisure, with counterbalance time which is used to try
to tone up one’s nerves (Congar 1960). Ruyer himself, faced with this
very problem in his critical review of Stent, does not really offer another
answer than that of maximising one of the terms of the alternative:
pace Cournot’s philosophising on the rise of mechanised planning, we
are inventing silently the means of a reinvestment of the ludic (Ruyer
1975; see also Gagnon 2014). The first stage of the industrial revolution
brought a new world of slaves serving machines, of depersonalised
individuals without cultural background. Then, there was a reaction
when educated people tried to gain a personal culture enabling them
to live more easily the life of the mind. If, however, the machine sets
men free from the necessity of toil, automation will increase this trend
and there will be, as Freud stoically admitted in Civilization and Its
Discontent, the question of having freed more time, but ‘to do exactly
what?’
A Spinozist ontology reabsorbs the mysterious aspect of God and
collapses it in the immanent and manifested. In L’Embryogenèse du
monde, Ruyer insists on the presence of undisclosed possibilities (Ruyer
2013: 162–4), yet he does not want for an irrational exploration of
possibilities. What this means is that if we realised the absorption of
the universe in the human piloting agent, as many versions of the
cyberworld have dreamt of, we could perhaps get a universe remade
in our image, but again, what would we act for? Ruyer contemplated
this situation, when he pointed out clearly that for humans to be
made facies totius universi, with the universe remade in human traits,
would usher us into that situation theatrically portrayed in Also sprach
Zarathustra: an overcoming of what it has meant to be human. We
know the invectives directed at those who claim that their status of
letzte Mensch, of the highest fruit of cosmic becoming, places them at
the pinnacle: they have not invented the new tables of value (Nietzsche
1974: 47). Similarly for Ruyer, in this situation, the whole universe,
even if it acquired our beating heart through some concretisation of the
kind contemplated by Simondon, would leave us suspended, depending
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on meaning and its unending adventurous exploration (Ruyer 1953:
262). This is not adventure in Verne’s sense, it is not exploration for
exploration’s sake, rather it signals the attainment of a view to the
monde fini, the finite world as in Valery’s aphorism, which alone makes
possible the recognition of God as utterly Other, as the Source and End
of meaning and values.
Ruyer rejects any interpretation of freedom that succumbs to rational
technocracy. He wants individuals to think about a volitional void
or potency that is immediately ‘plenitudised’, filled with the strenuous
character of meaning (sens), which takes over from physical laws, and
allows in return to look back at those and see that, all along, they
were obeying what is in fact a norm. In the last retrenchment of his
metaphysical work, Ruyer has displaced the rationalist conviction of
epistemology which would orient the work of scientific thinking towards
the pursuit of intelligibility. His is not a philosophy of intelligibility,
placing in the knower the ultimate -/-*-,)- which comes with the re-
establishing of technical information. Intelligibility surely puts the mind
to rest, but would furnish nothing that could account for its perdurance
as ontogenetic dynamism. It would merely furnish an abstract scheme,
but nothing which could even remotely account for the experience that
is dynamic consciousness, a process that ‘goes over the edges’ of the
scattered points of mechanism. It is less intelligibility that prospective
thinking pursues than meaning. This assures us that there will always be
a horizon beyond, and it is why the reservoir of all the possibles which
will be named God through much apophatism cannot present itself as
an end in itself, as a Person in the Kantian sense, but has to present itself
as vital potency or at best ontogenetic dynamical vital conditions. This
ontological norm presents the problem, as discussed, that perhaps there
is nothing more abstract than the conditions implied to generate what
is abstract. Precisely, for whoever has mapped out Ruyer’s idiosyncratic
inversion, an abstract that informs the actual is not abstract, since it is
perpetually filled by the desire of beings in their quest to achieve abstract
form, true beings who pursue the always-yet-to-be-fulfilled universal
nature of that form.
Notes
1. The Belgian mathematician, astronomer and demographer (who lived from 1796
to 1874), was the first to break a trend in using statistics in a moral way, using
the norm as he saw it to regulate, and thus to ‘feed back’ into social becoming.
2. Ruyer observed: ‘la connaissance, qu’elle vise le tout ou les parties, ne peut être
sans base d’information, autrement, elle ne serait pas une connaissance. – . . .
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knowledge, aiming at the whole or the parts, cannot be without an informational
basis, since otherwise it would not be knowledge’ (Ruyer 1963: 18). In another
article, Ruyer admits that some bonds are real even in heaps (Ruyer 1970b: 125).
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